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There is a political imperative driving environmental
diplomacy. It is the rising level of consciousness among
people everywhere of the serious nature of the global
environmental problems. One can feel it in the air at the
increasingly numerous international conferences held on
the subject. Governments are eager to be seen as taking a
constructive stance. It is time to translate that attitude into
action.'
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I. INTRODUCTION
As this quotation suggests, international environmental problems
have taken center stage since the end of the cold war, capturing the
attention of scholars and diplomats alike. The number of scholarly articles
devoted to the environment, particularly those focusing on international
environmental problems, has increased dramatically in the past few years. 2
The current literature seems optimistic regarding the role of international
law in creating solutions for international environmental problems.
Perhaps sparked by the recent successes in environmental treaty making,3
much of the literature contains aggressively idealistic proposals.4 We
think, however, that this literature generally fails to capture the realities of
the international political system and thus, the proposals are likely to fail
as solutions for international environmental problems.
This paper has a threefold purpose. The first is to examine the
views of legal idealists and suggest ways in which their views may be
miscast in light of current international political realities. The second is to
discuss an approach toward international politics and the behaviors of
states that present an improved perspective on the reasons why states
cooperate with each other. The third is to identify factors that have led to
the success of some international environmental legislation and compare
these factors to those of failed attempts. From these efforts we will
suggest a type of international environmental legal negotiations that will
explicate reasons for failed as well as successful attempts to create
international environmental law.
2. See generally Eric Lafferriere, Environmentalism and the Global Divide, 3 ENVTL.
POL. 91 (1994); Geoffrey Palmer, The Implications of Climate Change for International Law and
Institutions, 2 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 205 (1992); J.S. Barbosa, Greenhouse
Effect: Available Legislation and Needed Treaties and Agreements, 59 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 841
(1990); Dan M. Berkovitz, Pariahs and Prophets: Nuclear Energy, Global Warming, and
Intergenerational Justice, 17 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 245 (1992); Ranee K.L. Panjabi, Can
International Law Improve the Climate? An Analysis of the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change Signed at the Rio Summit in 1992, 18 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM.
REG. 491 (1993). For a discussion concerning the rise of environmental issues, see Jim
MacNeill, The Greening of International Relations, 45 INT'L J. 1 (Winter 1989-90).
3. See, e.g., Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16,
1987, 26 I.L.M. 1541, 1550 (entered into force, Jan. 1, 1989) [hereinafter Montreal Protocol];
Barcelona Protocol for the Prevention of Pollution of Mediterranean Sea by Dumping from Ships
and Aircraft, Feb. 16, 1976,15 I.L.M. 285, 290 (1976) [hereinafter Barcelona Protocol].
4. Palmer, supra note 1, at 283; Philippe Sands, The "Greening" of International Law:
Emerging Principles and Rules, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 293 (1994); Jose L. Fernandez,
Global Warming Legislation: Putting the Carbon Genie Back in the Bottle, 42 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 1095 (1991); at Peter S. Thatcher, Alternative Legal and Institutional Approaches to Global
Change, 1 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 101 (1990).
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II. IDEALIST PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW
There seems to be a clear understanding among both scholars and
diplomats alike that dramatic steps are necessary to preserve the already
degraded environment. Anthropogenic effects on the global environment,
too long ignored by large numbers of people and states alike, have clearly
emerged as one of the crucial issues in the 1990s. Preservation of the
international environment has even been recognized as a pressing issue of
global security.'
Two major forces seem to be driving the intensity of the current
environmental movement. The first motivating force can be identified as a
kind of "desperation" over the state of the environment and a fear that it
already may be too late to put it right. Many have fallen into a "panic
mode" and feel that drastic emergency action is mandated. Similar to the
need to "end war forever" that followed World Wars I and II, the
devastation of the environment, has resulted in an urgency among us rarely
felt in international law or politics in "normal times."
A second force driving the current environmental movement is the
new wave of international "idealism" which has followed the end of the
cold war. This idealism, rife within the literature of both international law
and international politics, has brought forth a significant number of
sweeping proposals to deal with various global problems. 6
Legal idealism seems particularly to have pervaded the area of
international environmental law.7 The end of the cold war has offered the
opportunity to turn away from the concern over the nuclear standoff
between the superpowers , and gave rise to, among other things, a
redoubling of efforts to solve the growing number of global environmental
problems. These efforts have lead to optimism on the part of many
scholars of international law and politics.8 Not unlike efforts to grant
5. See, e.g., Jessica T, Mathews, The Environment and International Security, in WORLD
SECURITY: CHALLENGES FOR A NEW CENTURY 274-89 (2d ed. 1994); Jessica T. Mathews,
Redefining Security, 68 FOREIGN AFF. 162 (1989); Philippe Sands, Enforcing Environmental
Security: The Challenges of Compliance with International Obligations, 46 J. INT'L AFF. 367
(1993); Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, On the Threshold-Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute
Conflict, 16 INT'L SEC. 76 (1991); Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, Environmental Scarcities and
Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases, 19 INT'L SEC. 5 (1994); Gunther Handl & Robert E.
Lutz, An International Policy Perspective on the Trade of Hazardous Materials and Technologies,
30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 351 (1990).
6. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
7. See supra note 4 and accompanying text; see also GREENING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1994).
8. See, e.g., Palmer, supra notes 1-2.
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compulsory jurisdiction to the International Court of Justice "I.C.J."
following the two world wars, 9 or similarly futile efforts to outlaw war,'0
international lawyers and politicians have called for tougher international
environmental law with sufficient teeth to make states comply with those
regulations necessary to halt the ongoing environmental degradation." As
the United States-Soviet conflict becomes a matter for historians, the time
seems ripe to take bold steps to preserve the environment. If attempts to
make environmental law are to succeed and not merely emulate the
attempts to outlaw war or to create compulsory jurisdiction for the I.C.J.,
they must reflect more of an awareness of the international political
system's limitations than those mostly futile efforts.
"Desperation" and "idealism" have come together to influence
thinking within the international environmental movement with two results.
These results can be called "needs" and "solutions." The former consists
of problem identification and specification of the goals necessary to return
the environment to the "status quo ante" degradation. The latter consists
of policy means for achieving the former. Because of the strength of these
two forces within the international environmental movement, there have
been many idealistic solutions proposed that fail to account sufficiently for
the realities of international politics."
While there may be little problem with the forces of panic and
idealism driving the problem identification half of the equation, (beyond a
"Chicken Little" syndrome)'3 there can be significant difficulty created by
these two forces on the solution side. Problems arise when laws are
promulgated that have little chance of success. Like the fifty five mile-per-
hour speed limit in the United States during the 1970s and 1980s, laws that
lack the support of vast numbers of relevant actors are doomed to be
broken and ignored. While occasional occurrences like this might not be
terribly harmful to the overall legitimacy of highly authoritative legal
9. See Lorna Lloyd, "A Springboard for the Future:" A Historical Examination of
Britain's Role in Shaping the Optional Clause of the Permanent Court of International Justice, 79
AM. J. INT'L L. 28 (1985).
10. The most famous example, of course, is the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact. Treaty
Providing for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, Aug. 27, 1928, 46
Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57.
11. Palmer, supra note 1, at 264. See generally Shabtai Rosenne, THE LAW AND
PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 364-67 (1965); Peter H. Sand, Institutions for Global
Change: Whither Environmental Governance?, 19 POL'Y STUD. J. 93 (1991); Abram Chayes &
Antonia H. Chayes, Adjustment and Compliance Processes in International Regulatory Regimes,
in PRESERVING THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT: THE CHALLENGE OF SHARED LEADERSHIP 280-
308 (1991).
12. See, e.g., Palmer, supra note 2.
13. Fernandez, supra note 4.
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systems, such as those of national policies, they can have a deleterious
effect on a more voluntary legal arrangement like international law.
We are not suggesting that international law is so fragile that the
slightest deviation will destroy its entire fabric and are mindful of its
centuries-long staying power, but there can be little doubt that international
law lacks the authoritative structure of domestic law. To treat it as though
it does, and to attempt to make laws accordingly, is to court failure. While
it may be true that poor laws are better than no laws (some people actually
drove fifty five MPH), it is also true that laws tailored to fit existing
political realities have a much better chance for success. They can form
the building blocks for future and, if warranted, more stringent
regulations. The laws themselves can be a form of consciousness raising,
a vital factor in the solution to any kind of problem, but only if they are
accepted by a sufficient number of actors within the legal system.
We proceed on the notion that the best way to solve any problem
or set of problems is to tailor the solution to fit the realities of the situation,
rather than to propose solutions based on some utopian view. While
relevant utopias can be useful in showing directions for future action and
consciousness raising, they rarely solve pressing problems. Recognizing
that solutions based on the likelihood of their success are often less than
ideal, however, they frequently suffice until political conditions allow
further progress. 4 In other words, while ideal solutions are best, they may
not be achieved because of current political realities. It is better to have
some action to solve a problem rather than none. Sufficing strategies,
therefore, may be the most practical in the long term.
Normally prudence would suggest, in the face of a potential
environmental threat and uncertain scientific evidence regarding that
threat, that it is better to err on the side of caution and take immediate
protective measures. The costs of taking protective measures against
potential threats, however, must be weighed carefully if states are to be
expected to forge international environmental legislation. This weighing
may often mean, as in the case of global warming, that initial protective
measures will not be as stringent as many deem necessary.'5 It should be
remembered that for a state whose proper "moral" obligation is to guard
the interests of its citizens,' 6 the cost of protective measures can run
14. Herbert A. Simon, Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with
Political Science, 79 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 293 (1985).
15. Palmer, supra note 2; James K. Sebenius, Designing Negotiations Toward a New
Regime: The Case of Global Warming, 15 INT'L SEC. 110 (1991).
16. Gary L. Scott & Craig L. Carr, Are States MoralAgents?, 12 SOc. THEORY & PRAC.
75 (1986).
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considerably beyond simple monetary costs. It may also involve the cost
of granting certain controls to third parties." Because of these expanded
costs, it is likely that the kinds of agreements most acceptable to states will
be either universal general principle agreements" or narrowly drawn
specific agreements either of a bilateral" or regional nature.20 While this
may be less than is deemed ideal, it is superior to trying to achieve
stringent comprehensive agreements that will fail to come to fruition.
Successful international law should be based on, and be a
reflection of, the contemporary international political system. Moreover,
the international political system should be understood, not merely through
the observation of constantly changing daily events or short-term trends,
but through the broader, more historical, perspective of international
political theory. There is then a necessary connection between theory
development in international politics and the development of successful
international law .21
It may seem of little help to suggest the creation of international
law should be based on general international relations theory, since there is
no universally accepted theory or perspective about the international
political system. Theories abound along a continuum ranging from
idealists on the one end to unreconstructed Machiavellian realists on the
other. 22 Where persons place themselves along this continuum will
17. One of the major stumbling blocks to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea was the creation of the deep seabed regime and the treaty's dispute settlement mechanisms.
U.N. Convention on The Law Of The Sea (Dec. 10, 1982) U.N. Doc. A/Conf 62/122 (1982),
reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261. (Entered into force Nov. 16, 1994).
18. See, e.g., Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985,
T.I.A.S. No. 11,097, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1516, 1529 [hereinafter Vienna Convention];
Barcelona Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution, Feb. 16,
1976, 1102 U.N.T.S. 27, reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 290 [hereinafter Barcelona Convention];
London Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Nov. 2, 1973, 12 I.L.M. 1319.
19. Treaty Between Canada and the United States of America Relating to Boundary Waters
and Questions Arising Along the Boundary Between the United States and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909,
Can-U.S., 36 Stat. 2448, T.S. No. 548; Canada-United States Agreement on Air Quality, Mar.
13, 1991, U.S.-Can., 30 I.L.M. 676, 678.
20. See, e.g., Barcelona Protocol, supra note 3; Athens Protocol for the Protection of the
Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution from Land-Based Sources, May 17, 1980, 1328 U.N.T.S.
105, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 863, 869 [hereinafter Athens Protocol].
21. For an excellent treatment of the developments in international relations theories,
particularly in the post World War II world, and their relation to the developments in
international legal theory, see Anne-Marie S. Burley, International Law and International
Relations Theory: A DualAgenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205 (1993).
22. For liberal or idealist perspectives on international relations theory, see for example,
Robert W. Cox, Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International Relations
Theory, 10 MILLENNIUM: J. INT'L STUD. 126 (1981); Richard K. Ashley, The Poverty of
Neorealism, 38 INT'L ORG. 225 (1984); and Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace, in KANT'S
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naturally condition their views of what is desirable and what is possible in
the realm of international politics and international law.
While there has always been a wide array of theories about the
behavior of states, certain theories, from time to time, capture the attention
of the majority of scholars. The popularity of these theories seems to run
in cycles. As one theory is blamed for the poor state of international
affairs, a new, or more likely recycled, theory comes to the forefront until
it too becomes the victim of the uncertainties of international politics.
Political realism was blamed for the breakdown in international politics
that led to World War I. It was replaced by Wilsonian idealism, which in
turn became the whipping boy for a resurgent realism after World War II.
As noted above, we seem, once again, to have entered a period where
political and legal idealism are ascendant. The Presidential Address at the
1993 International Studies Association annual meeting addressed the
"Neoidealist movement,"2' and the President of the American Society of
International Law has proclaimed the death of the "Sword" sovereignty.
Political and legal idealism seem to have captured the international
environmental movement as well. It is frequently assumed that solutions
to transboundary environmental problems require unprecedented levels of
cooperation, even altruism, on the part of the offending individuals or
states. 26 Given a shortage of altruism in the international system, it is
sometimes concluded that it is the sovereignty of the nation-state that
impedes international legislation.2' Works are still appearing that echo
Garrett Hardin's famous call for an authoritative solution to the "tragedy
of the commons."2
POLITICAL WRITINGS (Hans Reiss, ed., 1971). For realist theorists, see for example, KENNETH
WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1979); HANS J. MORGENTHAU & KENNETH W.
THOMPSON, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE (6th ed.
1985), and THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Francis B. Randall ed., Washington Square Press
1964) (1651).
23. .Burley, supra note 21, at 207-08.
24. Charles W. Kegley Jr., The Neoidealist Moment in International Studies? Realist
Myths and the New International Realities, 37 INT'L STUD. Q. 131 (1993).
25. Louis Henkin, The Mythology of Sovereignty, AM. SOC. OF INT'L L. NEWSL. (ASIL)
Mar.- May 1993, at 1, 7.
26. Lawrence Susskind & Connie Ozawa, Negotiating More Effective International
Environmental Agreements, in THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT 142-65
(ANDREW HURRELL & BENEDICT KINGSBURY eds. 1992); B.C. Brennan & B. Larschaw, The
Common Heritage of Mankind Principle in International Law, 21 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
305 (1983).
27. See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 25; Palmer, supra note 1.
28. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968); Lynton K.
Caldwell, The Geopolitics of Environmental Policy: Transnational Modification of National
Sovereignty, 59 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 693 (1990); see Palmer, supra note 1, at 283.
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It has come increasingly into vogue to model environmental
conflicts as prisoners' dilemmas. Such a conflict arises where the
interested parties are bound by situationally imposed logic to act in ways
that are not in the best interest of anyone. A change in the "payoffs" to
the "players" imposed by a central authority is the solution. 9 These
assumptions are frequently used to conclude that we need some
international plan or organization to manage all of the environmental
problems on our "spaceship earth."30  The adoption of stringent
international enforcement standards for environmental law is one proposed
idealist solution. Philippe Sands, for example, argues that the enforcement
of international environmental law must be done on two levels.'
First, enforcement is required at the national level because
of international treaty obligations. Treaties require states
to . . . develop, adopt or modify relevant national
legislation, policies and programs through administrative,
legislative or other means. . . . Enforcing national
compliance is a matter for the public authorities of each
state; some states also allow private enforcement through
suits brought by citizens.32
Second, according to Sands, enforcement is required at the
international level, "[o]nce there is evidence that a state has failed to
uphold an environmental obligation '"33 Thus, Sands expects states to have
sufficient internal authority (sovereignty) to be capable of upholding their
treaty obligations by sanctioning violations by their citizens; yet, he
expects the international system to be able to wield sufficient control over
states so that they also can be sanctioned. Sands notes that because of their
sovereign interests, states have been unwilling
to transfer much - if any - enforcement power to
international institutions. This unwillingness highlights the
fundamental tension between the juridical reality of states'
territorial sovereignty over their natural resources and the
physical reality of ecological interdependence. In a world
of shared natural resources it becomes increasingly
29. For a discussion of solutions created by changing the "payoffs," see ELINOR OSTROM,
GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION
(1990).
30. BUCKMINSTER FULLER, OPERATING MANUAL FOR SPACESHIP EARTH 49 (1969).
31. Sands, supra note 5, at 367.
32. Id. at 371-72.
33. Id. at 373.
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difficult to justify constitutional arrangements that
narrowly define states' abilities to enforce either
environmental rights or minimum standards of
environmental behavior."
There is a fundamental dilemma in what Sands claims should
happen. That dilemma is over sovereignty. It is difficult to see how states
can retain sufficient authority (sovereignty) to enforce not only
environmental laws, as derived in part through treaty obligations, but all
other laws and functions states are expected to perform and still be subject
to an external enforcement authority. Additionally, the acceptance of the
treaty obligations and the negotiations that precede the acceptance of the
text, all have sovereignty as their base. States have not yet come to the
point where there is an acceptance of external authority, except in limited
instances." This is the reason international governmental organizations are
formed in the first place and is one of the main reasons for any collective
state action. Additionally, states always retain the right to withdraw from
collective arrangements, and this too is a manifestation of their
sovereignty. The solution then is not to enforce international
environmental law by attempting to impose authority over states. Rather,
it is for states to realize that it is in their individual and collective self-
interests to promulgate and follow regulations that preserve environmental
integrity in the long term.
It may be inconvenient that those who degrade the environment
and those who suffer from that degradation are not always grouped
together within the borders of one sovereign state. However, the lack of
an authoritative regulator may not be the heart of the compliance problem.
One important method of gaining compliance with a law or agreement,
even within sovereign states, is "quasi-voluntary compliance."3 6 For quasi-
voluntary compliance to be successful, individuals must perceive the law
or agreement in question is generally in their interest and most other
individuals affected by it will comply with it as well, or be penalized. If
quasi-voluntary compliance is an important aspect of gaining widespread
compliance within sovereign states, then this calls into question any sharp
34. Id. at 375.
35. For example, when cost-benefit analysis has shown the limitation on their sovereignty
by outside authority has advantages over the continuation of the problem.
36. MARGARET LEVI, OF RULE AND REVENUE (1988) (defining "quasi-voluntary
compliance" and demonstrating its importance in generating compliance with domestic law);
OSTROM, supra note 29, at 7; ORAN YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: BUILDING
REGIMES FOR NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1989). Ostrom and Young
discuss the importance of quasi-voluntary in generating compliance with international
environmental agreements.
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distinction between methods we can use within sovereign states and those
we can use in international agreements.
As noted above, it is necessary that successful international law be
based on and reflect the contemporary international political system."
Despite its global concerns and pressing issues, this connection is no less
true for international environmental law. Current idealistic literature
notwithstanding, international rules of behavior generally, and those which
address environmental problems specifically, are predicated on each state
exercising sovereignty on behalf of its citizenry, both as a bargaining agent
with other states and as the agent ensuring the compliance of its own
citizens functioning within its own territory." Given the resources that
states have under their control, they are undeniably the most important
actors in the resolution of transboundary issues.3 9
States retain the sovereign right to decide for themselves if they
are to be bound by international agreements. Though strong efforts have
been made to create jus cogens, international law remains primarily jus
dispositivum.'° Given this somewhat controversial situation, it would be
most productive to begin the search for consensual environmental
international law with an understanding of what motivates states generally
to enter into consensual arrangements with other states.
III. WHY STATES COOPERATE
People are becoming aware that individual, and by extension, state
actions are altering the chemistry of the biosphere and the distribution of
species in it, with uncertain and frequently negative effects on themselves
and others. Moreover, persons and states alike are likely to change their
behavior only as they perceive that a change will benefit them, either
directly through improved environmental conditions or indirectly through
improved social conditions.
37. Scott & Carr, supra note 16. See also Gary L. Scott & Craig L. Carr, The
International Court of Justice and the Treaty/Custom Dichotomy, 16 TEX. INT'L L.J. 347 (1981)
[hereinafter Scott & Carr, The International Court of Justice]; Gary L. Scott & Karen D. Csajko,
Compulsory Jurisdiction and Defiance in the World Court: A Comparison of the PCIJ and the
IC!, 16 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 377 (1988); Gary L. Scott & Craig L. Carr, The ICJ and
Compulsory Jurisdiction: The Case for Closing the Clause, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 57 (1987).
38. MORGENTHAU & THOMPSON, supra note 22, at ch. 9 (discussing of the indivisibility
of ultimate authority). See Henkin, supra note 25, at 7 (discussing the limitations of the
indivisibility of ultimate authority).
39. But see Burley, supra note 21, at 226.
40. For a discussion of jus cogens and jus dispositivum, see GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER,
A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 29 (5th ed. 1967). For an alternative discussion on the
emerging use of jus cogens in international law, see GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG
NATIONS 583 (6th ed. 1992).
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If a state has strong material incentives to take action that seems
cooperative, then a state's decision may be based on straightforward
economic analysis of its interests without regard to the cooperative content
of the actions under consideration. As Alexander notes, cooperation can
be more apparent than real.4' The interests that occasion this apparent
cooperation are analogous to the preferences in an assurance game, rather
than those in the prisoner's dilemma game so frequently associated with
environmental issues. This type of cooperation might be ignored because
of the ease with which a cooperative solution is found under these
conditions.4 2  We should not make the mistake of supposing that
negotiations about this sort of issue can be a model for other sorts of
issues.43  We should, however, be careful not to neglect these non-
conflicting issues. This form of cooperation, while analytically trivial,
may have some decidedly non-trivial effects on future relationships.
Absent a material incentive for unilateral action, issue linkage can
often motivate cooperation, even in highly asymmetric and non-social
situations. This linkage could be the environmental equivalent of a hostage
exchange. Absent either of these two incentives cooperation can still
emerge. Cooperation may be the result of a reciprocal relationship in
which the exchange is neither contingent nor equivalent, what Keohane
calls "diffuse reciprocity."" Diffuse reciprocity might be thought of as
social credit-specific reciprocity on the easy payment plan, except that the
account may never be explicitly tallied.
Appeals to environmental and social self-interest, then, may be
effective in changing behavior. Linkage of one international
environmental issue with a different issue between the affected states may
also change an offending nation's calculus. Social relationships which
insure the mutual acceptance of obligations may be important in effecting
issue linkage. Linkage has been found to be important in various issues of
41. Lewis M. Alexander, Uncertainties in the Aftermath of UNCLOS III: The Case for
Navigational Freedoms, 18 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 333, 334 (1987).
42. Players in the assurance game have individual incentives to act in a manner that yields
mutually beneficial results whereas the opposite is true for players in a Prisoner's Dilemma. See
PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE ON LINKING LOCAL AND GLOBAL COMMONS 23-25 (1992);
Lisa L. Martin, Credibility, Costs, and Institutions: Cooperation on Economic Sanctions, 45
WORLD POL. 406 (1993).
43. See Sebenius, supra note 15, at 116 (discussing the inappropriate use of the ozone
negotiations and the premature dismissal of the Law of the Sea negotiations as models for
negotiations on other issues).
44. Robert 0. Keohane, Reciprocity in International Relations, 40 INT'L ORG. 4, 19-24
(1986).
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international interest including environmental issues.45  Keohane explores
the linkage of specific international issues with general relationships
between the affected states,46 But the ability to link an international
environmental issue with a general relationship may depend on both the
social relationship between the citizens of the states involved and the
nature of the issue. Environmental issues should not be lumped together as
if they were a single phenomenon. It is important to keep in mind what
attributes are common to various environmental issues and what
distinctions make them separate kinds of phenomena.
States, like individuals, care about their access to scarce resources.
Newton points out that as shared natural resources begin to be perceived as
"exhaustible" they become subjects of international tensions . This is true
whether the resource is the space to carry out activities, such as navigable
areas of the sea, resources to be harvested such as edible fish or genetic
material particular to a species, or a sink to be used for dumping, such as
the atmosphere's ability to absorb carbon dioxide, sulfur dioxide and other
chemicals. As one state's use of a resource exhausts that resource or
begins to subtract from other states' uses the potential for conflict
emerges.41
Unfortunately, neither the exhaustibility nor the subtractibility of a
resource is an objective fact.4 9 Both involve perceptions that emerge from
an understanding of the operation of the biosphere and an individual's
relation to it. Since the biosphere is imperfectly understood and since
everyone's relation to its resources is likely to be different, the chance for
a uniform perception of exhaustibility or subtractibility in any resource
system is small. Thus, cooperation based on these concepts may be slow
in taking shape.
Haas found that an epistemic community with a convergence of
values and expert opinion on the proper policy was important in gaining
45. For a theoretical discussion of issue linkage and the solution of prisoners' dilemmas,
see Michael McGinnis, Issue Linkage and the Evolution of International Cooperation, 30 J. OF
CONFLICT RESOL. 141 (1986); see also, Martin, supra note 42, at 407 (summarizing of issue
linkage and international CPR management).
46. Keohane, supra note 44, at 19.
47. W.F. Newton, Inexhaustibility as a Law of the Sea Determinant, 16 TEX. J. INT'L L.
369 (1981).
48. See generally OSTROM, supra note 29, at 32 (discussing subtractibility).
49. See Newton, supra note 47; Christopher D. Stone, Beyond Rio: "Insuring" Against
Global Warming, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 445 (1992).
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agreements in the ozone and Mediterranean water quality issues." His
findings indicate both the importance and the difficulty of achieving a
common understanding. We should expect, then, that conflict over
environmental issues, at a minimum, will revolve around both science and
resources.
In some cases the capture of exhaustible resources and its effects
on another state's use of those resources may be considered more or less
legitimate, depending on differences of ideology with respect to property
rights. Scholars using experimental techniques have found that some
formal inequities can be perceived as fair and therefore acceptable,
depending on the basis of the "inequitable" distribution.,, Therefore, even
when the science is clear, the perception of damage or injury may not be,
and as Simon has been at pains to point out, it is perceptions that matter to
rational actors. 52
Rational states have an interest in cooperating with other states in
the use of a resource when they value the future use of that resource and
when cooperation is perceived as being cost effective in preserving it.
Axelrod emphasizes the "shadow of the future" as a concept which assists
in the evolution of cooperation based on the valuation of future payoffs
(resources) and the expectation of future interactions. 3 States may also
decide to cooperate when they value some social relationship which they
expect will be degraded by a lack of cooperation. While this decision
would be expected to be made on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis, it
may not be because the value of social relationships, while appreciated, is
difficult to measure.
50. Peter M. Haas, Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean
Pollution Control, 43 INT'L ORG. 378 (1989); Peter M. Haas, Knowledge, Power, and
International Policy Coordination, 46 INT'L ORG. 23 (1992).
51. Elizabeth Hoffman et al., Preferences, Property Rights and Anonymity in Bargaining
Games, Presented at the Workshop on Political Theory and Public Policy, Indiana University
(1992). Elizabeth Hoffman & Mathew L. Spitzer, The Coase Theorem - Some Experimental
Tests, 25 J.L. & ECON. 73 (1982). Elizabeth Hoffman & Mathew L. Spitzer, Entitlements,
Rights and Fairness: An Experimental Examination of Subjects Concepts of Distributive Justice,
15 J. LEGAL STUD. 254 (1985).
52. Simon, supra note 14.
53. ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 126 (1984).
54. For example, the United States and Canada finally cooperated in going to the
International Court of Justice to resolve the Gulf of Maine issue largely because of the deleterious
effects that it was having on their overall relationship. See Delimitation of the Maritime
Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246 (Oct. 12); see also Jan
Schneider, The Gulf of Maine Case: The Nature of an Equitable Result, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 539
(1985) (discussing this case between Canada and the United States).
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Social relationships based on "diffuse reciprocity" differ from
those based on "specific reciprocity" because the value of the exchange
may be neither equivalent nor contingent." Therefore, states may
"cooperate" when their action, either alone or in concert with other states,
enhances the value of their own resource. They may also act to enhance
another state's resource if the other state is likely to act reciprocally to
enhance the resource of the first state. Finally, a state may act to enhance
the resources of other states if it simply values relations with those states.
It may even act in ways that seem altruistic, but only if a sufficiently strong
social relationship exists.
Based on the discussion above, the ways in which states come to
international cooperation on environmental issues can be separated into
four pathways. First, as states become individually aware that it is in their
best interests to unilaterally change their behavior with respect to
environmental degradation, they will begin to do so. We refer to this as
individually sufficient interests. Then, as they become aware that their
environment is being damaged by another state(s) they may seek to bargain
with that other state, to offer equivalent and contingent concessions to the
other state for the purpose of motivating it to cease its deleterious
behavior, Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration
notwithstanding' 6 We refer to this as "specific reciprocity." Subsequently,
as states become aware that their behaviors are detrimental to others with
whom they want to live according to rules that limit uncertainty, they may
seek to build an international society with acknowledged and accepted,
rules of environmental behavior. We refer to this as "bounded
competition." Then states may take actions in accordance with the
common interests of mankind. We simply refer to this as the "common
interests of mankind."
These paths to cooperation rely on different levels of interests and
social relationships. They span a continuum that runs from complete self
interest, with little or no social relationship involved, pathway 1, to minor
self interest, with highly developed and comprehended social interests,
pathway 4. Even pathway 2, specific reciprocity which relies principally
upon value exchanges, also relies on social relationships existing between
or among the parties to the negotiation. Without a minimal social
55. Keohane, supra note 44, at 7.
56. Principle 21 states, inter alia, "States have . . . the responsibility to ensure that
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other
States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction." Report of the U.N. Conference on
the Human Environment, Stockholm, June 5-16, 1972, U.N. Doc. A/CONF 48/14 (1972),
reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416, 1420.
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relationship the bargaining for tit-for-tat reciprocity could not take place
and the parties themselves would have no assurances that their return
would be forthcoming. Obviously cooperative structures that do not
incorporate an immediate and specific reciprocal exchange must rely even
more heavily upon a developed social relationship. Thus, our pathway 3,
bounded competition, relies quite heavily upon a combination of self
interest and a developed social relationship. Since pathway 4, common
interests of mankind, holds little in the way of perceived self interest for
states, it must rely almost exclusively upon a highly developed set of social
relationships. This pathway, while favored by many idealists, seems
somewhat wistful. One day all humans may universally acknowledge a
common social bond and always act accordingly. Humans seem to have
become aware that they are a single species and consequently have some
obligations to their fellow man, but the extent of these obligations has been
the subject of some considerable debate and disagreement.-" Pathway 4
should not expected to yield significant environmental regulations. These
pathways help to point out different motivations that have been more or
less effective in influencing state behavior in certain types of situations.
The differences in the four types of motivations should also be helpful in
understanding the differing utility of the various pathways in generating
cooperation in distinct types of physical situations or in situations where
the rigidity or stringency of the proposed environmental regulations vary
considerably.
It should not be supposed that the categories outlined above cleanly
separate environmental issues and the appropriate cooperation that must be
built to solve them. These categories separate aspects of environmental
issues. The strongest solution to any case where cooperation seems
appropriate or beneficial will incorporate more than one of the categories.
Multiple contributing factors are helpful, particularly when each has a
probability of generating cooperation that is less than one. For instance, if
individually sufficient interests ensure a ninety per cent probability of
cooperation by state A with respect to abstaining from behavior damaging
to state B, it would nice to be able to link some issues giving state A some
benefit from actions that state B agrees to undertake. Furthermore, it
would be better yet if states A and B also have had a strong social
relationship. Conversely, environmental cooperation that seems based
mostly on social relationships might be enhanced by adding some
individual interest motivator. While these categories posit a hierarchy of
motivations that are more or less important according to physical and
57. See, e.g., TRADITIONS OF INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 10 (Terry Nardin & David R.
Mapel eds., 1992).
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social factors, they are certainly not mutually exclusive. They are
additive.
Our pathways of cooperation then, are based on the concepts of
interests and sociality and are designed to separate aspects of
environmental issues into categories. Current global environmental issue
areas can be arrayed according to a progress scale that ranges from low to
high levels of cooperation. Our pathways of cooperation using the
concepts of interests and sociality applied to this scale should elucidate
incentives and disincentives for cooperation across issue areas and should
help explain why some environmental issue areas have succeeded at
eliciting cooperation and others have not.
The first concept, that of interests, is designed to separate aspects
of environmental issues into categories so that the type of cooperation
needed can be determined. In other words, the less the perception of self
interest by states in any given environmental issue, the greater the need for
truly cooperative behavior. This approach is analogous to a game
theorist's determination of the structure of a game 8 (e.g., is the Cuban
missile crisis a game of chicken, of coordination, or a prisoners'
dilemma?), but it incorporates a theory of preference specification and
does not necessarily involve strategic interaction.
The second concept, sociality, is designed to explain limited social
cooperation based on a history or expectation of bounded competition. It
theorizes certain socially based preferential tendencies in which states may
have found individual utility over time, and relies on the tendency to use
indicators or rules of thumb to identify valued individuals and
relationships. The concept of sociality is not intended to provide a general
explanation of state or human behavior by itself but rather to establish a
variable component of the mix of motivations to cooperate that individual
state leaders experience in any situation.59
Neither conceptual formulation offers a complete description of
transboundary cooperation. Together the two concepts attempt to define
the conditions that lead to cooperative solutions by showing the extent of
cooperation that is necessary and the amount of cooperation that can be
expected in a given situation. The concept of sociality complements the
concept of interests because sociality is important when individual material
interests are insufficient to generate conditions for cooperation.
58. Duncan Snidal, The Game Theory of International Politics, 38 WORLD POL. 25 (1985).
59. Scott & Carr, supra note 16.
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IV. SUCCESS COMPONENTS OF CERTAIN ENVIRONMENTAL TREATIES
In the following discussion we will show how the factors of
interests and sociality have combined in varying degrees to produce some
of the environmental regulations that have been promulgated in recent
years. This cursory analysis is meant to be suggestive and not expository.
But, it should enable us to add perspective to the question of why some
environmental regulatory cooperation has been successful and others have
not.
A. The Mediterranean Action Plan
The Mediterranean Action Plan (MAP) has been hailed as one of
the most important advancements in international environmental
legislation. 6' Further, MAP is considered to be successful from both
international political and legal perspectives due to the constant
advancements in the Protocol process made since the initiation of the
original Convention in 1976.62 This set of agreements, the first under the
United Nations Environmental Program's (UNEP) Regional Seas Program,
has also served as a model for ten other regional seas programs. 6
While MAP is a model of success at getting disparate states to
come together to create legal documents for the protection of the
environment, it may be considered less successful in getting the parties to
those documents to adopt and implement policies that would actually carry
out the plan envisioned by the Convention and its subsequent Protocols.
As Kutting points out, "[i]f cooperation rather than implementation is seen
as the aim of MAP, it can be described as a successful agreement.
Unfortunately, cooperation without implementation does not improve the
state of the marine environment. Thus MAP lacks effectiveness. "
60. MAP consists of an umbrella treaty and four Protocols. Barcelona Convention, supra
note 18; Barcelona Protocol, supra note 3; Barcelona Protocol Concerning Co-operation in
Combating Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea by Oil and Other Harmful Substances in Cases of
Emergency, Feb. 16, 1976, 1102 U.N.T.S. 27, reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 306; Athens Protocol,
supra note 20.
61. PETER M. HAAS, SAVING THE MEDITERRANEAN: THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION (1990).
62. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
63. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: A SURVEY
OF EXISTING LEGAL INSTRUMENT 200-01 (Peter H. Sand ed. 1992) [hereinafter THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS]. The Regional Seas
Programme has been renamed the Ocean and Coastal Areas Programme by UNEP. See TONY
BRENTON, THE GREENING OF MACHIAVELLI: THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 96
(1994).
64. Gabriela Kutting, Mediterranean Pollution: International Cooperation and the Control
of Pollution from Land-Based Sources, 18 MARINE POL. 233, 238 (1994).
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In spite of early attention to the problems of Mediterranean
pollution only minor progress has been made in the actual clean up of the
Mediterranean. That only minor progress was made is particularly true of
the control of land-based pollutants."6 Because of its widely acclaimed
success at bringing together a wide variety of states for the purposes of
environmental cooperation, and its somewhat less successful record, to
date, at bringing about the actual implementation of the protection of the
Mediterranean environment, it presents an excellent subject for inquiry
regarding our variables of interests and sociality. The discussion to follow
will show that limited self-interest and limited sociality can help explain
both the legal successes of MAP and the limited effectiveness of its
implementation.
Official notice of significant Mediterranean pollution came as early
as the 1960s." By the early 1970s, the degradation of the Mediterranean
had come to the attention of the international press.67 The major problems,
noted initially by states, were the pollution of the sea and beaches by oil
from tanker traffic and the health hazards created by untreated sewage
flowing into the Mediterranean." Recognition of these "visible" problems
was followed by alerts on metals, pesticides, and other pollutants, thanks
largely to the efforts of the scientific community in the Mediterranean area
and UNEP experts.6 9
According to Haas,
Concern about the implications of Mediterranean pollution
mounted between the late 1960's and 1974. Initial concern
was focused on oil pollution resulting from tanker traffic.
Subsequent studies and conferences demonstrated the need
for managing a more comprehensive range of sources and
channels of pollution, including land-based sources,
agricultural runoff, and marine dumping, as well as
65. Id. at 233.
66. See HAAS, supra note 61, at 66. Much of the following discussion is based on Haas
excellent work on the development of MAP.
67. See, e.g., John Cornwell, Is the Mediterranean Dying?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1971, at
24; see also HAAS, supra note 61, at 66.
68. HAAS, supra note 61, at 66-71.
69. See id. at 69. Haas calls these groups of scientists the "epistemic community" and
attributes much of the information gathering and consciousness raising to that community of
scientists. He also elucidates a policy role for the epistemic community in the bringing about of
MAP; see also Kutting, supra note 64, at 233-34.
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pollution transmitted by rivers and through the
atmosphere.70
Thus by February 1975, when the regional states of the
Mediterranean met at Barcelona for the Intergovernmental Meeting on the
Protection of the Mediterranean, all parties were sufficiently aware of the
dangers and economic costs of pollution to be attuned to creating a
solution. By February 1976 the parties had created and signed the first
three of the documents known as the Mediterranean Action Plan.1
Progress continued on MAP with the signing of the Protocol for
the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea from Land-based Sources in 1980
and the Protocol Concerning Mediterranean Specially Protected Areas in
1982.72 Two additional Protocols are under preparation.7" Further, the
party states to MAP have continued to meet regularly to further refine the
plans as originally specified. To this point MAP can be considered a legal
success. There has been a long period of cooperation leading to the
creation of several regulatory documents. Moreover, the cooperation
continues in this area where, because of the diversity of states and their
historical antipathies, one might not expect much success at forging
regional regulations. In this respect, the Mediterranean is a showcase of
international environmental cooperation.
Critics of the MAP process, however, have been quick to point out
that when faced with actual regulatory policies, the Mediterranean states
have been dilatory in carrying out the intended plans.7 4  For example,
though the Protocol against Land-based Pollution"l was signed and ratified
rather quickly by the member states, "no water quality and emission
standards have yet been set, nor have the specific compounds and products
70. HAAS, supra note 61, at 95.
71. The Convention and the first two protocols were completed in 1976. See supra note 60
and accompanying text.
72. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
73. The protocol currently under preparation is the Protocol on the Protection of the
Mediterranean Sea against Pollution Resulting from Exploration and Exploitation of the
Continental Shelf and the Sea Bed and its Sub-soil. "This protocol is designed to respond to the
obligation contained in Article 7 of the Barcelona Convention." THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 63, at 206. The other protocol is
the Protocol on Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, "designed
primarily to prevent uncontrolled hazardous waste traffic from developed to developing countries
in the Mediterranean Region." Id.
74. The Outlook is Cloudy for the U.N. 's Club Med. CONSERVATION FOUND. LETTER,
July-Aug. 1984, at 1. See Kutting, supra note 64.
75. See Scott & Carr, supra notes 16, 60 and accompanying text.
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that contain the banned substances been identified."76  Moreover, the
parties have not adopted measures relevant to Article 12 of the Barcelona
Convention which requires them to "undertake to cooperate as soon as
possible in the formulation and adoption of appropriate procedures for the
determination of liability and compensation for damage resulting from the
pollution of the marine environment"" (emphasis added). Nor have they
adopted formal procedures for compliance monitoring and control as
required under Article 21 of the Convention. 8 The omissions are serious
and auger poorly for the speed with which we can expect the
Mediterranean to be cleaned up and protected from further pollution. The
critics of MAP are not without justification in their criticisms of the
process to date.
The method by which MAP has proceeded is known as the
Convention and Protocol process. The Convention and Protocol process
involves the establishment of a framework agreement with subsequent
refining and implementing agreements or protocols. This process has been
hailed by some, mostly political realists, as the only effective way to get
states to cooperate. Legal and political idealists have criticized this
process as being too slow and ineffective at achieving the needed results
for environmental protection. It is easy to see how the results in the
Mediterranean might give rise to both perspectives, but an examination of
the factors leading to the creation and implementation of MAP suggests
which perspective has the most merit. 9
Both of our variables, interests and sociality, are present in the
creation of MAP, but the degree to which each has been present is telling
in the progress of Mediterranean protection. As noted above, all of the
Mediterranean states were aware of significant pollution problems as early
as the 1960's.10 Both developed and developing states were aware of the
harm that was being done to their own populations and their tourist
industries. France and Italy, two of the worst polluters, were instrumental
in pushing initially for a clean-up plan for the Mediterranean.8' Though
the states involved had different agendas, based upon political and
76. Kutting, supra note 64, at 236.
77. Barcelona Convention, supra note 18, art. 12, 1102 U.N.T.S. at 48
78. Barcelona Convention, supra note 18, art. 21, 1102 U.N.T.S. at 51. See
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 63, at 206-207.
79. For a discussion of the advantages and limitations of the Convention and Protocol
Process, see Sebenius, supra note 15.
80. "All states suffered from oil on beaches." HAAS, supra note 61, at 68.
81. Kutting, supra note 64, at 234; HAAS, supra note 61, at 73.
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economic reasons, all parties perceived they had sufficient self-interest to
begin negotiations and to adopt a pollution abatement and protection plan.
Foreign ministers had other objectives besides cleaning up
pollution. French and Italian delegates sought to promote
regional environmental legislation compatible with
international law, particularly EEC directives. LDCs
hoped to receive equipment to monitor pollution and get
training in oceanography and pollution control.
Environmental concerns also seemed like a good pretext
for establishing diplomatic linkages between such
otherwise hostile countries as Algeria and France and
Israel and the Arab countries. Greece and Spain,
returning to democratic governments, also hoped to use
environmental cooperation as a lever to assert an open
foreign policy. 2
Boxer notes that states like Malta, Lebanon, and Israel also used
the pollution issue to their political advantage. Malta and Lebanon sought
to enhance their international status by promoting the cause of pollution
control. Israel saw "an additional opportunity to gain political legitimacy
by expanding collaboration with scientific institutions in a number of
Mediterranean countries." 3
While motives varied and included more than just the concern over
pollution, each state involved had reasons, generated by their own
interests, in pursuing a clean-up plan for the Mediterranean. Moreover, to
states mostly interested in the pollution issues, it seemed that cooperative
measures were the only solution. This perspective, though partially
incorrect, was fostered by officials of international organizations who
desired a regional cooperative solution to the problem."s Interests, coupled
with a slight misperception about the need for a cooperative solution, went
a long way toward getting states to agree to MAP.
Sociality was also present to some degree in the Mediterranean, in
spite of political and economic differences that exist in the area. There
seems to have been a sense of "common responsibility to a shared
82. HAAS, supra note 61, at 71-72.
83. Baruch Boxer, Mediterranean Pollution: Problem and Response, 10 OCEAN DEV. &
INT'L J. 315, 322-23 (1982).
84. Haas explains that currents in the Mediterranean were insufficient to carry pollution far
from the polluting countries shores, but government officials were unaware of this. While UNEP
officials were aware of this fact, they kept silent hoping to achieve a regional solution. "[Blut
they hoped to complete and agreement, so they just smiled and nodded when others characterized
Mediterranean pollution as a common problem." HAAS, supra note 61, at 70.
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Mediterranean heritage."1 Boxer argues that the strength of the
community feeling about the Mediterranean was strong enough to
overcome political differences and continues to play a role in the legal
elements of MAP.6 Stjepan Keckes, director of the Regional Seas
Program of UNEP, noted:
We had to face the fact that a lot of them don't like each
other for what they consider good reasons, but they all
love the Mediterranean as a cultural asset, and they
recognize its economic value. They all knew they had a
problem and that none of them could solve it alone.8 7
In addition to the social relationship developed and the prospect for
future relations that this brought about, there were sub-regional social
relationships as well. These included those among the EC states that were
also Mediterranean coastal states, the Arab states involved, and the
LDCs.u There existed then, among the states involved, both sufficient
interests and sociality. Together with the information provided by the
epistemic community 9 and the urgings of international organization
officials,9° these factors culminated in the legal documents designed to save
the Mediterranean and to continue negotiations for twenty years.
The implementation of MAP seems to have lagged, however, this
may be a good indication that while there were sufficient interests to
generate the legal documents, particularly given the added dimension of
sociality, the self-interest generated by the problem was not strong enough
to overcome competing areas of self-interest and bring about their
implementation. The Protocol on land-based pollution has been the most
difficult to implement. This Protocol was to have come into full effect by
1995, "when fifty different measures for pollution control have to be set.
Only eight of these had been set by 1990."9' This Protocol has run
headlong into competing self-interests of the states involved. For example,
"France and Italy also opposed the protocol's coverage of rivers as the
Rhone and Po are major sources of Mediterranean pollution. "9
85. Boxer, supra note 83, at 316.
86. Id.
87. Daniel S. Greenberg, Diplomat of Troubled Waters, 15 INT'L WILDLIFE 41 (1985).
88. HAAS, supra note 61.
89. Id.
90. Boxer, supra note 83.
91. Kutting, supra note 64, at 237.
92. HAAS, supra note 61, at 112.
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Another factor leading to the difficulties over implementation may
be that the sociality factor was not strong, stemming mostly from the
Mediterranean as a cultural heritage and common possession (mare
nostrum)." It is easy to see that while this factor might be strong enough
to bring about negotiations among disparate actors, it might not be
sufficient to bring about implementation that is difficult to carry out in the
face of divergent and competing self-interests. States of greater similarity
and with a broad range of political and economic ties, like those of the
European Community, might find the implementation stage easier to effect
when faced with competing domestic political and economic interests. So
just as we find that our two factors of interests and sociality are important
in bringing about negotiated agreements, they must be present in a
stronger form if they are to bring about the implementation of those
agreements.
In spite of the lagging implementation, however, the picture is not
entirely grim. According to Keckes, "the Mediterranean is better now
than it would have been without the plan and has good prospects for the
future. "14 Brenton reports that there has been significant clean-up of
beaches and that more sewage is properly treated than before MAP.
Further, oil problems are in abatement because attendant to the first
protocol, 9 equipment for cleaning ships' ballast has been installed.9 Thus,
some progress has been made, albeit small compared to the overall
problems facing the Mediterranean.
MAP has been hailed as successful yet criticized for not being
effective. How are we to resolve these two contending views? We
suggested above that the theoretical perspective that one takes when
viewing world politics has a great deal to do with what one perceives.
MAP is a case in point. Legal and political idealists are discontent with
approaching environmental problems incrementally and impatient with the
lack of progress in such areas as the Mediterranean. Realists, on the other
hand, would expect that state sovereignty would naturally make things
difficult to accomplish, as states have competing interests that do not
93. Greenberg, supra note 87, at 42, provides the following insight into the weak social
relationships around the Mediterranean: "When we proposed to save the Mediterranean, enemies
put down guns to sign the agreement. And then they picked them up again." (quoting M.
Michael Grenon). For a discussion of mare nostrum, see Philip Allott, Mare Nostrum: A New
International Law of the Sea, 86 AM. J. INT'L. L. 764 (1992).
94. Greenberg, supra note 87, at 41, (quoting Stjephan Keckes, Director of the Worldwide
Regional Seas Program, which is part of the UNEP).
95. BRENTON, supra note 63, at 100.
96. Id.
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always allow them to make rapid progress, even on commonly shared
problems.
Haas notes that in putting together MAP,
[s]tates successfully defended their sovereignty.
Governments only learned as much as, or were willing to
pursue new goals that did not severely interfere with their
traditional responsibilities. . . . Namely, the form of
learning was that which was least threatening, at least in
the short run, to states' pursuit of autonomy and security.,
States should be expected to defend their sovereignty and they will
continue to do so as long as the world is organized into nation state units. 91
As Haas goes on to correctly point out, "[t]he organization of the
international sphere by nation-states is not in doubt."9 Further, any
international environmental legislation must be aware of this fact and play
on the self-interested nature of states to make the most of social
arrangements among them.
Given the political realities of world politics in general, and the
Mediterranean region in particular, the Mediterranean Action Plan can be
hailed as a success. On the implementation side, keeping these same
political realities in mind, we should not be overly pessimistic about the
progress that has been made so far. While it has taken nearly thirty years
from problem recognition to meager implementation, progress has been
made. Social relationships concerning the Mediterranean are in their
nascent stage, but can be expected to grow. Moreover, states' self-interest
in the issue should increase as the pressure of the global environmental
movement continues. While MAP has not met idealist expectations, it is a
major step in this world of self-interested sovereign states. MAP was an
example of regional cooperation in a highly diverse region. The next
issue, that of stratospheric ozone regulation, will show how sufficient
interests were generated globally for the bringing about of the Ozone
Convention and its attendant protocols.1°°
B. Stratospheric Ozone Depletion
The set of agreements to limit substances which deplete
stratospheric ozone has been heralded as an example of worldwide
97. HAAS, supra note 61, at 228.
98. Scott & Carr, The International Court of Justice, supra note 37, at 348.
99. HAAS, supra note 61, at 228.
100. Montreal Protocol, supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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environmental cooperation and a model for future negotiations.'0' The
progress that was made, in dealing with an increasingly menacing global
problem, particularly near the end of the 1980s, was indeed impressive.
Few problems requiring state cooperation on a global scale move from
bare recognition to something approaching solution in less than two
decades. The success in agreeing to limit substances that deplete
stratospheric ozone appears even more dramatic. Given its resemblance to
the infamous "commons" of Garrett Hardin's influential analysis this
should have been a particularly inauspicious candidate for broad
international cooperation.0 - While the agreements, particularly the Vienna
Convention'3 and the Montreal Protocol,m have been used to illustrate
several new concepts about international environmental agreements, we
contend that they are more valuable as an illustration of the age-old
concept that states begin to recognize their individual interests in
negotiating a treaty, or in acceding to one, they do so.
As was the case with MAP, the states concerned about ozone' 5
could not solve the situation by acting alone.1'0 For any state to fully enjoy
the ozone protection, all states must participate in its preservation. This
101. RICHARD E. BENEDICT, OZONE DIPLOMACY 3 (1991). Benedict refers to the
Montreal Protocol as a "prototype for an evolving new form of international cooperation." Id. at
3. See Sebenius, supra note 15 at 113. In reviewing lessons applicable to forming a global
climate regime, Sebenius reports that "environmental diplomats have largely looked favorably on
the step-by-step, framework/protocol model used for the CFC accords. . . . Yet ensuring
significant action to curb greenhouse gas emissions will be a far more difficult task than dealing
with . . . the ozone layer." Id. See also Peter M. Morrisette, The Evolution of Policy Responses
to Stratospheric Ozone Depletion, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 793, 794 (1989). Morrisette claims
that
[tihe Montreal Protocol has stirred much interest, and both scientists and policy makers
have suggested that it can be used as a model for international agreements on other
global environmental problems, especially the problem of C02 and trace-gas induced
global warming. . . . Depletion of stratospheric ozone is an example of both the
complicated and the global nature of contemporary environmental problems, and the
Montreal Protocol shows that innovative approaches to such global environmental
problems are possible.
Id. at 794; see also Peter M. Haas, Banning Chlorofluorocarbons: Epistemic Community Efforts
to Protect the Stratospheric Ozone, 46 INT'L ORGANIZATION 187 (1992). "The protection of the
stratospheric ozone layer is a striking instance of international cooperation." Id.
102. See Hardin, supra note 28.
103. Vienna Convention, supra note 18.
104. Montreal Protocol, supra note 3.
105. In this article "ozone" is used to mean the stratospheric ozone layer. Ozone appears
in other places in the biosphere, most notably as a particularly offensive element of tropospheric
smog, but this article is referring only to the ozone occurring in the stratosphere.
106. See, e.g., BENEDICT, supra note 101, at 1 (discussing the interdependence of
countries on the issue of ozone depletion).
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fact became increasingly apparent in the two decades after ozone depletion
became a subject of policy relevant inquiry. Also, as with MAP, success
in the ozone agreements hinged on the self-interested actions of the
principal states. Unlike the MAP negotiations, sociality, or what
amounted to the reverse of it, may have played a significant role in
hindering the progress toward an agreement on ozone.
The concern over chlorofluorocarbons as an ozone depletion agent
originated in 1974 when Stolarski and Cicerone published their conclusion
that chlorine has a destructive effect on stratospheric ozone.107 In addition,
Rowland and Molina published evidence for their hypothesis that CFCs
persist in the atmosphere until they reach the stratosphere where they
break down and release large amounts of chlorine.'08 These findings were
particularly alarming because of the long-term nature of the danger
stemming from both the long atmospheric lifetime of chlorofluorocarbons
and the long-term catalytic nature of stratospheric chlorine in the
destruction of ozone.
The global ozone layer was known to shield the biosphere from
high energy ultraviolet light (UV-B), that was known to be damaging to
humans and other living organisms.' °0 Still, there was no clear mandate for
worldwide action. The science was in the form of hypotheses. Although
corroborating evidence existed, there was no clear and complete
understanding of the' actual mechanisms that take place in the
atmosphere. 10 CFCs were an important class of chemicals because they
were cheap to produce, efficient, and safe in many uses, particularly when
compared to the chemicals they replaced.' Scientists, therefore, had
107. Richard S. Stolarski & Ralph J. Cicerone, Stratospheric Chlorine: A Possible Sink
for Ozone, 52 CAN. J. CHEM. 1610 (1974); see also Steven C. Wofsy & Michael B. McElroy,
HOx, NOx, and ClOx: Their Role in Atmospheric Photochemistry, 52 CAN. J. CHEM. 1582
(1974).
108. Mario J. Molina & F. Sherwood Rowland, Stratospheric Sink for
Chlorofluoromethanes: Chlorine Atomic Catalyzed Destruction of Ozone, 249 NATURE 810
(1974). This was the basis of what is often referred to as the Rowland-Molina hypothesis. The
Rowland-Molina hypothesis built on the work of James Lovelock, Atmospheric Fluorine
Compounds as Indicators of Air Movements, 230 NATURE 379 (1971).
109. Paul Crutzen, A Review of Upper Atmospheric Photochemistry, 52 CAN. J. CHEM:
1569, 1570 (1974) (stating ozone "provides a shield against lethal ultraviolet radiation").
BENEDICT, supra note 101, at 20 (reporting that increased rates of skin cancer, eye cataracts,
disruption of agriculture and fisheries, possible climate change, and a number of other negative
effects, were all suspected or well established by the time of the Montreal negotiations).
110. BENEDICT, supra note 101, at 15 (reporting that negotiators of the Montreal Protocol
faced "great uncertainties" in the science of ozone depletion).
111. See KAREN T. LITFIN, OZONE DISCOURSES (1994) (presenting a particularly
thorough discussion of the evolution of the science of ozone and the policies concerning
substances that deplete it).
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presented policy makers in CFC-producing or consuming countries with
the problem of dealing with a class of chemicals which were of economic
as well as health and safety importance but which might be causing
long-term damage to a layer of the atmosphere that protected the entire
earth.
This early state of knowledge about chemicals and ozone depletion
might be expected to yield the same sort of incentives that lead the herders
in Hardin's metaphorical "commons" to cause the "tragic" destruction of
their own environment"2 or the prisoners in the prisoner's dilemma
game--so widely applied to environmental issues--to defect, or the
individuals trying to form a collective action to free ride on others' efforts
to collectively clean up the environment."3  Each of these analogies
predicts that individual decision makers will not act to alleviate their
environmental problems without the interference of some outside factor,
such as a hegemon, an environmental regime, etc., and generally leads to
the policy prescription of international governance or privatization."
The problem, according to this logic, is that the benefits of actions
that cause environmental destruction are always greater than those of
cooperation. A user who is doing harm to a commons gets the full benefit
of his actions while sharing only proportionately in the costs of the
degradation, which is spread among all of the users of the commons. This
logic rests on the assumption that the increment of damage that accrues to
any particular user of a commons from that user's degrading actions is less
than the benefits to that user of his actions, regardless of what other users
do. This was the case in the pasture that was Hardin's metaphorical
commons, and may be the case in many actual environmental commons. It
may even be the situation in the case of ozone. Ozone is indeed a
commons, even a common pool resource (CPR), because it is shared both
as a UV-B shield and as a sink for chlorine by people who cannot be
excluded from using it. Anyone using it as a sink subtracts from the value
that all users of its shielding quality obtain." 5
The ozone layer, however, has some characteristics that are
frequently ignored by those who predict the destruction of commons.
These characteristics may have contributed to each and every producer or
consumer of ozone depleting substances having a strong interest in
reducing their own as well as others' emissions of those chemicals. Each
112. Hardin, supra note 28.
113. OSTROM, supra note 29 (discussing widespread application of these notions as
"models" of environmental issues, and of the dangers in doing so).
114. Id. at 10.
115. Id. at 30 (discussing and defining CPRs).
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and every user of ozone as a sink also depends on the availability of ozone
as a shield. ' 16 No reduction in the use of ozone as a sink by any one user
increases the incentive for other users to increase their use of it as a sink.
The benefits to any producer or consumer of CFCs have always
been reasonably well known and concentrated while the costs of producing
and releasing CFCs were into the 1980s uncertain,"7 but thought to be
diffuse." 8  Of course, both the costs and benefits of any environmental
action are based on perceptions. The benefits of CFC production are
largely economic ' 9 while the benefits of CFC use are both economic and
related to safety.2 0 The benefits of CFC production and use are therefore
immediate and accrue solely to the producer or user and were well
understood in 1974. If anything, these benefits intensified during the
1980s as CFC use increased. 12' The costs of CFC production and use were
different because of the uncertainties and the diffuse nature of the damage.
Initially it appeared that any country considering restrictions on
CFCs would bear a significant cost to generate uncertain future benefits
that would be shared by the world as a whole. 22 This might have indicated
to a rational policy maker that no action was the best strategy based on the
incentives. 2 1 But the scientific community's understanding of the
116. Id. at 35. Ostrom does realize the extent to which variations in the dependence of
users on a resource effect variations in success in managing those resources. Id.
117. See, e.g., BENEDICT, supra note 101, at 13-18.
118. Ozone depletion was frequently discussed as varying by latitude and season, but not
by locality. See, e.g., Eigil Hesstvedt, Reduction of Stratospheric Ozone from High-flying
Aircraft, Studied in a Two-dimensional Photochemical Model with Transport, 52 CAN. J. CHEM.
1592 (1974); Julius London & Jae H. Park, The Interaction of Ozone Photochemistry and
Dynamics in the Stratosphere, A Three Dimensional Atmospheric Model, 52 CAN. J. CHEM. 1599
(1974).
119. While the production of CFCs was a major economic activity, "the immediate
beneficiaries of the London Revisions would be the world's largest chemical companies" because
"phasing-out CFCs meant a guaranteed market for substitutes, a market that favored the chemical
giants with their large research budgets and laboratories." LITFIN, supra note 111, at 155.
120. See Fluorocarbons and the Environment: Report of the Federal Task Force on
Inadvertent Modification of the Stratosphere (IMOS), COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY 93-96 (June
1975) (discussing the safety aspects of CFCs relative to substitutes).
121. See, e.g., BENEDICT, supra note 101, at 25-27, 48.
122. See BENEDICT, supra note 101, at 201 (commenting on the uncertainty facing
negotiators as the Montreal negotiations proceeded). For a discussion of the global nature of this
uncertainty, see also Protection Against Depletion of Stratospheric Ozone by
Chlorofluorocarbons, NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 133 (1979).
123. Only isolated concrete actions took place in limiting CFCs for more than a decade
after 1974. For example, the United States, through the 1976 Toxic Substances Control Act,
Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (1976) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629
(1982) and the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 C.F.R. §§ 2.125, 173.345, 189.191,
300.100, 500.49, 700.23, 801.417; 40 C.F.R. §§ 712.1.-5, 762.1-.21 banned the use of
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chemistry of chlorine and bromine in the atmosphere changed, thus
supplying the incentive for nations to act.Iu
During the 1980's particularly after the signing of the Montreal
Protocol in 1987,"2 researchers posited with increasing confidence that
these and other chemicals, including CFCs used as refrigerants and
solvents, halons used as fire extinguishers, bromides used as fumigants,
and other products such as carbon tetrachloride, were currently depleting
stratospheric ozone and that the amount of these chemicals already
released into the atmosphere would likely do significant damage to the
stratospheric ozone layer for decades to come. 26 They also learned that
while these chemicals disperse throughout the entire stratosphere, so that
the potential for damage is worldwide, the destruction of ozone is more
pronounced in the presence of ice crystals in polar regions and on sulfate
particles in other regions. 27 Additionally, while the ozone depletion,
culminating in ozone "holes", is more serious at the poles, significant
reductions have been reported at lower latitudes as well.1'2 Potential health
effects of increased UV-B radiation such as skin cancer, cataracts and
suppression of the immune system were recognized. 29  Other
environmental effects, such as destruction of phytoplankton and the
ensuing destruction of the global food chain on which it is based were also
recognized. 30
The story that scientists were telling during this time depicted
unacceptably large costs from the chlorine already released into the
atmosphere. Any more chlorine releases might be disastrous. The
consequences of ozone depletion may have caused policy makers to look at
the risk with what Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein have called
nonessential CFCs in aerosols effective December 1978. For a further discussion of this matter
see Morrisette, supra note 101, at 805. See also Protection Against Depletion of Stratospheric
Ozone by Chlorofluorcarbons, supra note 122, at 134.
124. See LITFIN, supra note 111, at 117-77; BENEDICT, supra note 101 (presenting
discussions of the changing scientific consensus on stratospheric ozone and the compounds that
deplete it).
125. See Montreal Protocol, supra note 3 and accompanying text.
126. See, e.g., BENEDICT, supra note 101, at 9-22, 108-17; LITFIN, supra note 111, at
117-76 (discussing the development of the science of ozone and the perceptions of this science by
policy makers).
127. See LITFIN, supra note 111, at 131.
128. See, e.g. Warren E. Leary, Ozone-Harming Agents Reach A Record, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 4, 1992, at C4.
129. LITFIN, supra note 111, at 56.
130. See Ian H. Rowlands, Ozone Layer Depletion and Global Warming, 16 PEACE &
CHANGE 260 (1991) (discussing the environmental effects of ozone depletion and its potential
social and political consequences).
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"dread.""'3  The benefits of CFCs were also declining during this time.
Acceptable alternatives were being introduced with the prospect that others
would be coming along soon.
With the change in science came a change in interests. It was
certainly in the interest of every state to try to persuade other states to limit
their use of CFCs, but now it was also in the interest of every state to
reduce their own use of CFCs regardless of what other states did. While
no state could solve the problem alone, each state could make a
worthwhile contribution to their own safety. United States officials
estimated that "between 1986 and 2075 the deaths of 993,000 Americans,
whose lives are valued at one point three trillion, can be avoided with a
twenty per cent cut in CFC use. Transition costs are not thought to exceed
four billion. "132
Indeed, we see that the United States took two unilateral steps to
reduce the production of CFCs, one in 1978' 3 to limit non-essential uses of
CFCs and another in 199213' to eliminate the use of all ozone depleting
chemicals ahead of the previous schedule. In 1987, during the Montreal
negotiations, the United States Senate considered taking unilateral action if
the protocol that emerged was not sufficient.'3 Germany, the Netherlands,
and Denmark took unilateral actions to eliminate the use of ozone
depleting chemicals more rapidly than the United States.' 36  Morrisette
claims that the "international response clearly followed from the concern
raised in the United States, Canada, Sweden, and other countries which
had taken unilateral action to control CFCs in the 1970s. '3
These unilateral actions demonstrate that some states found
sufficient reason to act regardless of any multilateral action, both for the
intrinsic value of the action and to demonstrate to other states that their
grave assessment of the situation was sincere. The largest change in
attitudes seems to have come in the wake of the Ozone Trends Panel report
released on March 15, 1988138 which indicated strong evidence for chlorine
131. Slovic et al., Facts and Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk, in SOCIETAL RISK
ASSESSMENT: How SAFE IS SAFE ENOUGH? 181-216 (1980). Morrisette utilizes the concept of
"dread" in his discussion of the ozone debate. See Morrisette, supra note 101, at 814.
132. Mark Crawford, Ozone Plan Splits Administration, 236 Sci. 1052, 1053 (1987).
133. See supra note 126 and accompanying text
134. Id.
135. Haas, supra note 101, at 207.
136. LITFIN, supra note 111, at 168.
137. Morrisette, supra note 101, at 794.
138. See Steven J. Shimberg, Stratospheric Ozone and Climate Protection: Domestic
Legislation and the International Process, 21 ENVTL. L. 2175, 2190 (1991).
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causing significant reduction of stratospheric ozone over North America
and Europe. As a result of the Ozone Trends Panel report, pressure for a
phaseout of CFCs began to mount.'3 9 DuPont, announced its intention "to
get out of the chlorofluorocarbons business entirely" shortly thereafter
because of the Ozone Trends Panel report, honoring a commitment made
years earlier.'"' British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher reversed the
long standing resistance of the British position after consultation with the
Stratospheric Ozone Review Group (SORG) which had published an
executive summary in June 1988 supporting the Ozone Trends Panel report
findings .141
The progression of the negotiations to control substances that
deplete the stratospheric ozone layer to a treaty with a strong protocol may
usefully be analyzed using the concepts of interests and sociality, although
in a way different than with MAP. The progress on ozone negotiations can
be thought of as roughly approximating the progress that was made in
understanding the threat to all human existence caused by release of ozone
damaging substances. As states became increasingly aware that they were
damaging themselves by the production and use of these chemicals, they
became aware of their interests and took unilateral action to stop their own
destructive behaviors. They simultaneously cooperated in a multilateral
actions to protect the ozone. While ozone like the Mediterranean, could
not be cleaned up by any state individually, each state's action seemed
more and more likely to yield a positive payoff for itself. The likelihood
of a positive payoff results from two aspects of the ozone "commons."
First, ozone began to be perceived not merely as an important interest but
as vital to the survival of each and every one of us. Beyond considerations
of skin cancer and immune system problems, the destruction of plant life
could well jeopardize life on earth. 42 Those who released ozone depleting
substances began to see themselves as not only degrading the environment
but as performing potentially suicidal acts. Second, the reduction in use of
ozone depleting substances does not encourage others to use more.
In the case of many commons, when one user takes less, other
users may take more. Ozone depletion is different because it is a
by-product of other activities. There is no direct benefit from depleting
ozone. Incentives to deplete ozone only arise when an ozone depleting
139. BENEDICT, supra note 101, at 111.
140. William Glaberson, Behind Du Pont's Shift on Loss of Ozone Layer, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 26, 1988, at 41.
141. Haas, supra note 101, at 216.
142. L. DoTro & H. SCHIFF, THE OZONE WAR 31 (1978) (discussing the possibility of
the extinction of species due to ozone depletion).
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substance or process is cheaper or more convenient for the user than a
nondepleting substitute. The use of ozone depleting substances and
processes yields no intrinsic benefits. In contrast, depletion of the fish
stock in a fishery is often seen as a by-product of fishing. The difference
is that taking fish always yields economic benefits, regardless of the
"substitutes" to fishing that may exist. The reduction of a state's
production and use of an ozone depleting substance does not encourage
other states to produce and use these substances. Instead, the production
and use of ozone depleting substances may be reduced through the
introduction, or price reduction, of a substitute. In fact some developing
nations responded by reducing their consumption of CFCs ahead of
schedule because they did not want to invest in an obsolete process. In
addition, the availability of new and cheaper substitutes persuaded many
developing nations to reduce consumption of CFCs. '  Unfortunately,
although individually sufficient interests pushed the negotiations forward,
the conditions of sociality among several of the parties retarded them. In
some relationships, the rule governed competition that we claim to be
fundamental to sociality had recently broken down with respect to ozone.
In other relationships there was an old history of behavior outside the
bounds of sociality.
The approximation breaks down in two instances. England and
France were particularly resistant to the emerging scientific consensus over
the dangers of CFCs. They denied the scientific conclusions until 1988.'4
China and India, along with some developing states, resisted the idea that
they should be denied the same benefits accruing from the use of CFCs
which the developed states had already enjoyed. India was particularly
adamant that developing states not return to a position of technological
inferiority just after they had acquired CFC technology. 14 5 Both of these
problems in the negotiations resulted from the failure of the states involved
to develop a relationship that included a high degree of what we are calling
"sociality."
This failure may seem surprising given the close relationship
between the United States and Western Europe. However, the issue of
ozone between United States on the one hand, and England and France on
the other, had a history of apparent deception concerning ozone that gave
England and France special reasons to doubt the veracity of American
143. See LITFIN, supra note 111, at 142, 159.
144. See BENEDICT, supra note 101, at 104, 114.
145. Id. at 188-96.
[Vol. 2:23
1995]
warnings on that issue. 1 6 Some of the developing states were requested to
abstain from such useful and affordable chemicals as CFCs, just as they
were acquiring them. This appeared to be "environmental colonialism;"
an attempt to keep the developing states in a position of disadvantage.147
England's and France's efforts to operate supersonic transports
(SSTs) on the North Atlantic route in the early 1970s explain their attitudes
regarding the ozone issue. 4 At that time the United States through
Boeing's advanced SST program, England and France, cooperatively
through the Concorde, and the Soviet Union, were competing to develop
SSTs which were assumed to be the coming generation of commercial air
transports. The stakes in this competition were high and success for the
Europeans would have meant that they had overcome the dominance of the
United States in the commercial aircraft industry.4 9 Many people in the
United States opposed the introduction of supersonic transports, regardless
of whether they were American, European, or Soviet. Opponents of the
SSTs based their opposition on economic and environmental grounds.'-
The environmental danger was brought to the attention of policy makers
and the public through the work of such scientists as James McDonald and
Harold Johnston.'-' The United States finally killed the United States
SSTs, leading to the cessation of European efforts. Claims made by
United States scientists that SST flights would deplete the ozone and cause
increased skin cancers in the United States led to the demise of the United
States SSTs.5 2 Although effective, this argument proved to be incorrect.
Actually, the SSTs would actually have made small amounts of ozone at
the altitudes which they were projected to fly. 5 3
146. For a good discussion concerning the problematic relationship between the three
states, see DOTTO & SCHIFF, supra note 142, at 297. See also Morrisette, supra note 101, at
801.
147. See BENEDICT, supra note 101, at 189.
148. This connection is noted by Benedict. See BENEDICT, supra note 101, at 32.
149. MEL HORWITCH, CLIPPED WINGS: THE AMERICAN SST CONFLICT 193 (1982).
"Across the Atlantic with their Concorde program, the British and French appeared to be making
a determined effort to wrest from the United States its post-World War II dominance of the
aviation industry." Id.
150. For a discussion of the opposition to the SST program, based on a variety of
environmental and economic concerns, see HORWITCH, supra note 149, at 215.
151. The above discussion of the contributions of these and other scientists to the demise of
the SST program, and of the history of the United States, England, and France, and the ozone
depletion problem is based on DoTTo & SCHIFF, supra note 142.
152. DOTTO & SCHIFF, supra note 142, at 61.
153. Id. at 2, 117.
Scott
56 ILSA Journal of Int'l & Comparative Law
The British and French never took the SST ozone threat seriously.
They believed the United States created this ozone threat in order to
maintain United States dominance in the aircraft industry.'- ' When the
United States used ozone damage as a reason to cap or reduce the sale of
CFCs, the British and French questioned the United States' motives, since
the British and French had gained a considerable market share in CFCs.
They suspected that DuPont, the major United States manufacturer of
CFCs, had a secret replacement for CFCs and that the United States was
pushing the issue to advance the commercial interests of one of its major
companies. "
England and France were the largest holdouts among the
industrialized countries, alleging that they did not believe the scientists'
claim of ozone danger.5 6 Prime Minister Thatcher changed England's
position once she received information from British scientists validating the
legitimacy of the American scientific findings of danger. American action
in the SST issue may have destroyed a portion of the social relationship
between the British, French, and the Americans. By breaking the
legitimate rules linking scientific conclusions about safety with commercial
interests, the United States may have sacrificed the sociality which
stimulates cooperation for mutual benefit.
When the United States appeared to manufacture "scientific"
threats to the environment and to health as a tool of commerce, they
breached the rules of commercial competition. Although the inaccurate
science of ozone depletion by SSTs increased awareness of the
uncertainties of science, France's and England's suspicions, and
particularly the reluctance of Prime Minister Thatcher to accept any
science not endorsed by British scientists, indicates a deeper problem. The
damage to the sociality between the United States, England, and France,
caused by the SST misadventure, had to be overcome before England and
France could be influenced by American scientists in assessing their own
interests in controlling substances that deplete the ozone.
India and China acceded to the treaty when benefits from reducing
their use of CFCs increased. Although the principal issue was the
availability of new technology to developing states, a fund to defray the
costs of changing to substitutes was also important.'- India's environment
154. Id. at 116.
155. See BENEDICT, supra note 101, at 23 (discussing the relationship of SSTs to British
and French suspicious, as well as the position of England and France in the CFC market).
156. Id.
157. For a discussion of the factors that influenced India and China to change their
positions, see BENEDICT, supra note 101, at 188.
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minister, Maneka Ghandhi, objected to any agreement that would leave the
developing states dependent on foreign technologies, arguing "we have a
problem [about] turning into a client state." 8 Malaysia's Minister of
Science, Technology, and Environment has been quoted as claiming that
"denying access to modern technology amounted to 'environmental
colonialism." " "The Malaysian negotiator at Montreal ...characterized
the treaty as 'inequitable."' ' 0 The process did, however, provide a large
fund for the developing states, and for assistance in obtaining new
technology.
Although both India and China, along with other developing states,
were interested in technology transfers and financial assistance, they did
not hold identical positions and China publicly stated satisfaction (after a
commitment of money and technology) before India did so.' 6' The
developing states were in a very different situation from the industrialized
states. When Indian "officials in private conversations had characterized
the issue as a 'rich man's problem--rich man's solution,"' 61 there was a
certain veracity to this characterization. The developing states used a
relatively small amount of CFCs. 61 Unlike the industrialized states, the
developing states could make very little difference in the ozone by
changing their present usage. In addition, unlike the industrialized states,
affordable alternatives to CFC's were not a certainty to the developing
states. Obviously, the developing states had little interest in changing their
immediate behavior, since they were being asked to make sacrifices by
states that had grossly exploited them in the past and with whom they had
little history of bounded competition.
Interests and issues, of course, do not present themselves.
Individuals avail themselves of reputed facts and sometimes with extreme
effort make issues out of them. Individuals, therefore, make a difference
in every effort to formulate international law on each new environmental
issue. Just as McDonald and Johnston were of fundamental importance in
adding ozone depletion to the list of concerns about the SSTs, Tolba was
158. Id. at 189.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 100.
161. Id. at 196.
162. BENEDICT, supra note 101, at 100-01.
163. India and China accounted for only two percent of the world CFC consumption in
1986, and the remainder of the LDCs consumed only fourteen percent. Haas, supra note 101, at
199 (citing James K. Hammitt et al., Product Uses and Market Trends for Potential Ozone-
Depleting Substances, 1985-2000, RAND Corporation, R-3386-EPA, May 1986; and U.S.
Government Accounting Office, Stratospheric Ozone, GAO/RCED-89-49, February 1989).
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an integral part of the success in bringing the negotiations on substances
that deplete the stratospheric ozone layer to the stage where many states
have acceded to a treaty requiring major changes in behavior. But just as
surely as Tolba was instrumental, he worked in an atmosphere where
strong interests were emergent--an emergence that was partly facilitated
through his efforts.
Interests do not tell the whole picture, however. Certainly the
factors identified by Richard Benedict as important lessons from the ozone
negotiations were important in bringing about the London" and
Copenhagen' 6 Amendments.
A factor that should not be overlooked in examining these
negotiations is the emergence of a state interest in limiting its emissions of
stratospheric ozone depleting chemicals. We do not maintain that this
emergence was not fitful nor that the perceptions of interests were
identical, but merely that an understanding of the nature of this
environmental problem gave states a sufficient interest in action to deal
specifically with it. We also maintain that cooperation on controlling
substances that deplete ozone was stifled by a lack of sociality between
some of the parties.
V. CONCLUSION
This article has undertaken to demonstrate that idealistic
approaches to international law and politics notwithstanding, effective
international environmental regulations, require sufficient interests on the
part of the relevant states. In addition, a perception of sociality amongst
the parties can heighten their sense of long-term self-interest and increase
their desire to cooperate on environmental issues.
Our theoretical discussion of the reasons why states cooperate
indicated that three of the four pathways to environmental cooperation;
individually sufficient interests, specific reciprocity, and bounded
competition, were more likely to yield cooperation on environmental issues
than idealist appeals to the fourth pathway, the common interests of
mankind.
Our two case studies of successful "convention/protocol"
approaches to two distinct and difficult environmental issues have
demonstrated that states can come to a self-interested perspective for a
variety of reasons. The most obvious reason has to do with threat
164. Montreal Protocol Parties: Adjustments and Amendments to the Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, June 29, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 537.
165. Montreal Protocol Parties: Adjustments and Amendments to the Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Nov. 25, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 874.
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perception of the immediate problem. In the Mediterranean, states
considered both cultural and economic self-interests in creating solutions to
the pollution problem. In the case of stratospheric ozone depletion, the
perception of health hazards was high amongst most participating states.
On both issues, the epistemic community helped create an
awareness that environmental problems were sufficiently serious to involve
a state interest in their solution. Because these environmental problems
did not lend themselves to unilateral or bilateral solutions, multilateral or
global cooperation was seen as necessary by most parties.
In both issues, however, self-interest for some states had to be
generated in a variety of other ways. Technology transfers, perceptions of
international status gains, and side payments, all helped generate sufficient
self-interest in actors not originally interested in cooperating.
Sociality was particularly important to increasing the interest of
states in the Mediterranean. The existence of sociality within the epistemic
community enhanced the solidarity of the Mediterranean States' position in
presenting a coherent and convincing set of information to policy makers.
The various states had sub-regional interest groupings that also enhanced
their feelings of sociality relevant to the problem. The Ozone situation
was rather different with respect to sociality. As explained above, past
social relations over the ozone issue among some of the parties had
generated a sense of distrust. Therefore, sociality was partially negated as
a factor in these negotiations.
While the two successful negotiations above have some points of
comparability with each other, one must be cautious about attempting to
see any successful negotiation as a "model" for any other negotiation.
Environmental problems are not a single phenomenon and while sufficient
self-interest and sociality have played significant roles in each of the issues
presented above, it should be noted that they did so in different ways.
Political and legal idealists will undoubtedly continue to urge states
to cooperate for the sake of all mankind. This does no harm and may
eventually lead to a global consciousness. In the meantime, however, we
live in a world dominated by states. Leaders see the interests of their
states in a variety of ways, but sufficient self-interest still remains the
strongest motivating factor in international cooperation. For international
environmental law to be successful, not only in the rule making phase, but
in the implementation phase as well, must play on this fact. Generating
state interest about the need to stop environmental degradation is difficult
and time consuming in a rapidly degrading global environment. However
in our world of states, it is the sine qua non of effective environmental
protection.
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